I n the current environment of increasing health care costs, employers are searching for the most cost effective manner to provide health care benefits to their employees . Many corporations are either directly or indirectly contracting with providers and creating their own managed care programs in an effort to exert more control over the delivery and costs of health care. However, by becoming more involved in and exercising greater control over the delivery of health care services, corporate purchasers of health care are finding their potential for liability increasing and new legal questions being raised regarding the extent of that liability. Employers must evaluate the potential liability of the managed care entity with which they contract or the employer sponsored program they create to develop effective risk management programs. * ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
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defined as "any health care arrangement that includes cost containment strategies, risk allocation among insurance entities, providers and employers, and claims administration and reporting" (Weiner, 1990) . It is not the fixed, prepaid premium that distinguishes it from the traditional fee for service method of financing of health care; rather, it is to whom the premium is prepaid (Wein er, 1990 ) . Under the traditional fee for service type of health insurance, the insurer pays the health care provider directly and payment is made only when the insured uses a health service. Under a managed care system, the insurer and provider maintain financial and organizational ties. In most arrangements, the insured prepays the managed care entity a fixed premium. The insurer then pays the provider a fixed sum for each insured enrollee every month, regardless of whether or not the enrollee uses any health services. In return for these monthly payments, the health care provider must render whatever health care services the enrollee requires.
The obligations of a managed care organization (MCa) to its members are based on its organizational structure and relationships with employers, regulators , providers , and member subscribers. The applicability and efficacy of the various theories of liability and defense utilized in malpractice claims against MCa largely depend on the type of organization or arrangement involved . With the evolution in MCa structure, membership, and medical management activities during the past decade as competition within the health care industry has escalated, new hybrids and mixed models are being created as the need arises (Friedman , 1993 ) . As a result, definitions are less useful than in the past. Employers entering the managed care arena may contract with MCa or individual provid-*This article is limited to a di scussion of areas of potential liab ility for employers tha t are related to negl igent acts ofparticipating providers. Physician s or other provid ers who are harmed by a managed care entity decision als o may bring suit. These actions, whic h include antitru st violations, interference with contractual relat ionships and others, are beyond the scope of thi s art icle. ers, or they may directly employ providers for occupational and other health care services to their employees (Cowans, 1994) . The employers in essence become the insurer and assume all risks inherent in assuming that role.
Most MCa are subject to both federal and state regulations. State statutes are rapidly evolving; those in existence differ in both the scope and focus of their regulations. However, continued regulation, oversight, and monitoring of managed care operations are trends likely to continue as state governments, like employers, face the dilemma of increasing health care coverage for state residents while trying to decrease the costs of that coverage (Weiner, 1990) .
The statutory and common or case law related to MCa medical management obligations and liability exposure is also in a state of rapid evolution. Recently, MCa have been added as party defendants in medical malpractice claims against health care providers. Medical malpractice liability of MCa arises from three distinct, but often overlapping, legal theories, which include: vicarious liability, based on the doctrines of respondeat superior or actual agency, and apparent or ostensible agency; direct liability or corporate negligence, based on the failure to exercise reasonable care in selecting or supervising the negligent provider; and independent corporate acts of negligence, particularly bad faith claims, denial, and negligent utilization review (Weiner, 1990) . MAY 1994, VOL. 42, NO.5 
Vicarious Liability
A managed care entity may be held vicariously liable under a variety of theories for injury to a client as a consequence of a participating provider's malpractice. When a MCa employs its providers, liability may be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. This doctrine assumes that an employer directs the actions of its employees and consequently is vicariously responsible for the results of such actions. This type of action would apply only to a managed care entity that directly employs providers. Courts have held that when the elements of an employer-employee relationship or an agency exist, a corporation may be vicariously liable for the malpractice of its employeephysicians (Sloan v Metropolitan Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc, 1987) .
Because it is difficult to prove that a MCa supervised or controlled a physician, courts have considered expanding the scope of potential liability of MCa to include the malpractice of independent contract providers under the theories of ostensible agency and corporate negligence. Under an ostensible or apparent agency theory, an individual's status as an employee or independent contractor does not determine liability. Instead, ostensible agency exists when one either intentionally or negligently allows another to believe that an agency relationship exists. Where health benefit plans give subscribers the impression that the health care personnel are acting as the plan's agents, ostensible agency may arise and the plan may be vicariously liable for the malpractice of its apparent agents . The more provider choice is restricted, the more likely a finding of ostensible agency will result (Boyd v Albert Einstein Medical Center, 1988; Chittenden, 1991) .
Direct Liability
A MCa may be held directly responsible for the negligence of a contract provider under the theory of corporate negligence. A claim of corporate negligence is based on the theory that the organization has an independent duty to protect subscribers from malpractice by its providers when it knows or should have known that such malpractice was likely. In some cases, members of a managed care entity have brought claims against the entity for some action or inaction of the MCa itself which they claim directly resulted in injury. The health benefit plan also may be liable in negligence for a breach of duty to its subscribers to select the providers carefully.
Under current law, hospitals are already liable for patient injury resulting from negligent credentialing of the medical staff and from failure to provide ongoing review of their competence. MCa have a similar responsibility to control the quality of their providers. Cases in this area emphasize the responsibility of the MCa to make a "reasonable investigation" of provider credentials, monitor the care provided, and act on the information obtained. These steps must be taken at the time of provider selection and on an ongoing basis (See Harrell u Total Health Care, Inc, 1989) .
MCO that contract with providers and limit the members to using the designated providers would be most susceptible to this theory of liability. This theory might also apply to cases in which there is a strong in centive for the client to use a contracted provider so that the client's choice has been limited. Plans with only modest financial incentives to choose an in-network provider would have less exposure.
Bad Faith Claims Denial
Cases in this area are based on the allegation that a necessary referral was not made because the payment mechanism to the provider discouraged referrals. Courts maintain it is the responsibility of the insurer or the employer health plan to engage in good faith investigation of claims submitted. In the utilization review process, the good faith requirement considers the scope of review, standards of care applied, and the appeals process offered.
Determining wh ether benefit s will be available for specific services are decisions made by insurers and MCO every day. Courts are called on to examine the manner in which exclu sion is determined as well as the clinical judgment used. Lack of adherence to established policies for coverage denial and inadequate claims investigation performed by inexperienced personnel have been the basis for courts generally favoring subscribers over insurers and MCO.
Other cases have focused on the manner in which discretion has been exercised in the denial of claims. Courts are aware of the inherent conflict of interest of the insurance company or managed care entity between paying for claims and making a profit. Adequate application of reasonable clinical standards has been used as a basis on which courts have ruled. Where a reasonable process to make the coverage determination is adequately revealed in the contract and discretion of the decision maker is directly stated, courts will more often favor the insurer or MCO (B ush u Dake, 1989; Gosfield, 1991) .
Negligent Utilization Review and Medical Necessity Determination
Providers traditionally have been liable for poor quality outcomes. MCO combine the provider's liability with many of the liabilities ofthe insurer (Gosfield, 1991 ) . Where insurers impose utilization controls as a way to manage care and minimize inappropriate use of services and facilities, courts will impo se liability for injuries suffered where clients have been denied care determined not to be "medically necessary." Courts scrutinize contract provisions and language including exclusions for care not deemed medically necessary as a result of utilization review. Definitions of terms such as "medically nece ssary" become important in this context (See Wickline u California, 1987) .
Recent case law shows that the courts are beginning to expand tort and contract liability principles to managed care plans to ensure the safe delivery of health care services. These decisions recognize that managed care plans provide not only a method of payment for health care services , but have some ability to control the delivery of those services. In addition, the managed care entity is now being perceived as a provider of health care services. As a result, the legal responsibility of this entity toward its enrollees and its health care providers is expanding.
EXPANSION OF LIABILITY TO THE EMPLOYER PURCHASER OF HEALTH CARE BENEFITS
As yet , employers have not been found liable for negligence related to employee injury occurring under a managed care program controlled by the employer. However, as the employer becomes more involved in provision of direct care for its employees and actively controls the delivery of health care benefits, employers will be exposed to the same types of liability as other MCO. Some legal experts now opine that if a MCO can be found negligent, so can the company that selected it for its employees. Others dismiss employer liability as tenuous (Geyeli n , M. , "HMO's Malpractice Immunity Is Fading," Wall Street Journal, February 1, 1990, ni.i Employer or insurance company liability for corporate negligence, however, would seem to be the next logical step for LEG A L ISSUES courts. Selection of a managed care entity in combination with restriction of a client's choice of provider could create an employer's duty to investigate both the quality of services provided by the managed care entity and the provider selection process. Directly contracting with providers could create a duty to determine the quality of the providers selected.
In most instances, the employer or insurer, in the case of a malpractice liability action, is protected by several "buffer lay-erS' including the provider, managed care entity, or hospital. Up to this point in time, defendants have been limited to providers, managed care programs, hospitals, or a combination of these entities. However, as the employer or insurer becomes more involved with the provision of health care to employees by either contracting directly with MCa or operating their own infacility service, their chance of being named as a defendant in a malpractice suit correspondingly increases.
RISK PREVENTION MEASURES
Because the managed care market is changing and expanding rapidly, new models of managed care may be more susceptible to liability than the traditional models. Rapid expansion of new model MCa, coupled with the fact that many inexperienced parties are entering the MCa market, creates fertile ground for litigation. Although the scope and even the existence of obligations to subscribers is far from settled, it is appropriate MAY 1994, VOL. 42, NO.5 to implement preventive measures to minimize a Mca's noncontractual liability exposure related to its medical management activities.
Proactive claim avoidance strategies advised for employers include:
• Incorporating a hold-harmless clause or indemnification agreement in the contract with the MCa or provider requiring they assume responsibility for allliability in the event of suit.
• Requiring providers to purchase adequate malpractice insurance coverage. If an individual provider has sufficient malpractice insurance to satisfy a judgment, award, or settlement, the plaintiff may be reluctant to spend the additional time and resources to pursue a vicarious liability or ostensible agency theory against the employer. • Purchasing their own professional and general liability insurance to cover the risks of adverse health care outcomes. The employer may be added as a defendant if a member initiates a malpractice action against a participating provider. The coverage under consideration should be reviewed carefully by the employer, the risk manager, the insurance broker, and legal counsel to ensure that it covers as many potential risks as possible.
• Providing complete and accurate benefit information to employee subscribers. Benefit agreements should clearly express and limit an organization's contractual obligations to its subscribers. Specific definitions of such terms as medical ne-cessity, emergency services, experimental or investigational procedures, and custodial care should be incorporated, and any exclusions or limitations should be specifically explained to avoid ambiguity about the services covered in the benefit agreements (Touse, 1993) . For Employee Retirement Income Security Act (E RISA) qualified plans, the benefit information should also refer to member rights and remedies under ERISA for all claims relating to the plan. *
• Not guaranteeing the quality of care to employee subscribers. Those who vouch for quality may expect to be held accountable for quality, or for failure to take reasonable steps to control actual quality of services provided. • Using due diligence in selecting MCO or provider. • Not interfering with the day to day provision of health care services.
• Disclosing to employee subscribers the exact relationship between the provider and the employer. The relationship should be clearly explained in certificates of insurance, brochures, other information distributed to subscribers, and in provider participation agreements.
*A source of defense to immunize an emp loyer from liability is ERISA (29 USCA sec. lO02[J] [a] West Supp. 1991), whi ch establis hed standards for employers wh o choose to provide benefit plans to their employees. If a claim is found to relat e to an employee benefit plan fallin g under this statute, it may come within ERISA's broad preemption claus e and th ereby limit the viability of a state tort action .
LEG A L ISSUES • Avoiding appearance by the organization that a provider is an employee if the provider is in reality an independent contractor. Materials used in day to day operations should be examined and revised, if needed. Marketin g and advertising materials should avoid the unintended inference of an employee-employer relationship . Consent forms used by independent contractors should be distinct from the consent forms used by employee providers. Similarly, a dress code should be established to distinguish independent providers from the organization's employees.
• Distinguishing client care management from benefits management. Managed care organizations must avoid creating an impression to subscribers that the employer is providing the care or is involved in the medical decisions made by providers. Any documentation should emphasize that providers are solely responsible for all treatment decisions.
• Moving to quality based incentive programs for providers that are not primarily weighted with utilization or financial factors. This precaution would avoid the implication that a cost containment practice or decision influenced the provider's profession al judgment.
• Installing well designed and fair utilization management procedures. It should be clear to members that they may appeal any adverse benefit determinations.
• Establishing a dispute resolu-254 tion procedure for subscribers. A contractual grievance process that must be exhausted prior to suit will provide early warning for potential claims and the ability to avoid a suit entirely or reduce the costs of claims (Simon, 1993 ) . • Conducting medical management activities in accordance with any applicable regulatory requirements, the organization's own policies and procedures, and any generally accepted industry standards to demonstrate they are exerci sing reasonable care when making medical management determinations.
• Ensuring that quality assessment programs are effective and incorporate sophisticated data management systems for monitoring the provision of care. These programs should evaluate access, apparent underutilization, and member complaints to ensure that the utilization management procedures and financial incentives do not encourage providers to undertreat the members. • Describing in writing the organization's provider credentialing procedures. These procedures should establish specific and objective participation criteria to assess applicants' professional competence and qualifications, including, at a minimum, verification of professional references, malpractice history, insurance coverage, hospital privileges, and licensure.
Occupational health nurses are in a critical position as employers assume more responsi-bility for providing health care. Nurses can be instrumental in helping employers understand their potential liability and in implementing the risk prevention measures discussed above.
